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Abstract 
In order to strike the appropriate balance between creating and 
protecting value, management considers an overall risk profile in order 
develop expectations  that are established by the risk appetite of the 
company.  Risk appetite as acceptable parameters for risk taking 
opportunities that is consistent throughout the company, and reflects a 
mutual understanding between management’s willingness to allow risk 
exposure in pursuit of core strategic objectives. 
Conversely, managers see risk appetite as an impractical, one-time 
assessment that limits them when making decisions. Making use of 
secondary data collected through library research, journals and analysis of 
reports, the paper reviewed the impact of risk appetite on the value of a firm 
and concluded that an organization must consider its risk appetite at the same 
time decides which goals or operational tactics to pursue. To determine risk 
appetite, management, should take three steps of developing risk appetite, 
communicate risk appetite, monitor and update risk appetite. 
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Introduction 
Risk taking is an essential part of business today, as a company must 
make informed and rational decisions about the risks they want to take in 
pursuit of goals and objectives of the organization.. It is a known fact that 
organizations must be able to define their risk appetite, risk tolerance and 
risk targets to effectively align strategy execution and risk management 
processes to achieve a competitive advantage, that is, a company must 
understand how much risk it is willing to take and how it plans to balance 
risks and opportunities before designing and executing a set strategy 
When risk appetite has been clearly defined by the management, it 
becomes their responsibility to communicate the risk appetite throughout the 
organization to ensure these actions of the company at all levels are in line 
with the risk the company is willing to accept. 
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A major barrier to the implementation of effective management is the 
lack of a definition of risk appetite. Risk appetite lies at the heart of good 
management, yet the term is frequently misunderstood, meaning different 
things to different people. Risk appetite can best be thought of as the 
relationship between the organization’s value (or expressed as an annual 
return) and the maximum acceptable level of risk- which we again expect to 
be upward-sloping but convex (so that increase in risk have to be 
“compensated” by increasing larger amounts of value). Thus risk appetite 
illustrates the maximum level of risk the organization is prepared to bear to 
achieve a given return or alternatively, the minimum level of return it is 
prepared to earn for a given amount of risk. 
Corporate governance is an ongoing process by the management to 
create and protect enterprise value. As management interacts and makes 
decisions, they are also reflecting on the overall risk appetite of the company 
which is an aggregate summary of assertions that provides a basis for 
clarifying both risks the company is actively taking and risks that are 
purposely avoided. The objective of this study is to look and review the 
impact of risk appetite on the value of a firm. 
Literature Review 
 The notion of risk appetite is well covered in the literature in regard 
to its technical calculation and assessment when applied to financial 
investment. The association between remuneration and risk appetite in 
organizations, however, receives far less attention. This literature review will 
concentrate on the work of prominent academics contributing to the field. In 
recent times a body of technical and compliance literature has also developed 
in response to the impact of the global financial crisis. This review will not 
seek to critique the technical literature, but rather, the scholarly works that 
are to inform the design of the research project. 
 A major barrier to the implementation of effective management is the 
lack of a definition of risk appetite. Risk appetite lies at the heart of good 
management, yet the term is frequently misunderstood, meaning different 
things to different people. Risk appetite can best be thought of as the 
relationship between the organization’s value µv (or expressed as an annual 
return) and the maximum acceptable level of risk- which we again expect to 
be upward-sloping but convex (so that increase in risk have to be 
“compensated” by increasing larger amounts of value). Thus risk appetite 
illustrates the maximum level or risk the organization is prepared to bear to 
achieve a given return (or alternatively the minimum level of return it is 
prepared to earn for a given amount of risk). 
 Industry studies have also highlighted a high degree of confusion. A 
recent survey by AIRMIC (2009) found a lack of consistency in 
organizational definitions of risk appetite, even following the production of 
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supposedly “universal” definitions in standards like BS31100. The British 
Standards publication in 2008 known as Risk management Code of Practice 
offers the following definition of risk appetite” the amount and type of risk 
that an organization is prepared to seek, accept or tolerate”. On the whole 
Risk appetite can be considered as one of the building blocks of effective 
risk management initiative. 
 Edward Bowman is contributor to the question of risk in 
organizational decision making is cited in many of the works that will be 
examined later. Bowman (1980) identified a paradox between the assumed 
relationship between risk and return and the reality. He contended that the 
common belief that higher risk resulted in higher returns was flawed and that 
in reality firms with lower risk profiles were more likely to deliver higher 
average profits. Bowman continued his research in subsequent years and 
developed his theory to demonstrate that trouble companies actually take 
more risk (Bowman 1982). He reinforced these findings in the years that 
followed through further research including content analysis (Bowman 1984) 
that provide further evidence supporting his position that low profits trigger 
higher risks. 
 Whilst Bowman’s work has been widely acknowledged it is not 
without it critique. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1985), for example, in 
examining Bowman’s risk- return paradox point out that it does not hold 
across time periods. Therefore the time period of examination must be 
carefully chosen with due regard to wider environmental factors which may 
critically offset the result. 
 Bowman is also supported by Bromiley (1991) who demonstrated 
that performance can be shown to have a strong negative influence on risk 
taking in organizations and that risk taking has a negative influence on 
performance. Bromiley makes the interesting observation that poor 
performing executives not only take more risks but they take bad gambles. A 
bad gamble being a substantial risk with a disproportionately low return. 
There is little in the literature that attempts to explain why one executive 
performs better than another with the exception of some references to 
personality type. Stewart and Roth (2001) , for example, argue that 
individual predispositions influence risk taking in conjunction with 
situational factors. In addition they Steward and Roth (2001) claim their 
research to show entrepreneurs are likely to demonstrate a propensity for risk 
than their managerial counterparts when pursing profit and growth. 
 Bowman employs the work of Kehneman and Tversky (1979) that 
draws on the expected utility theory to develop an alternative model of 
describing decision making under risk which they have named prospect 
theory. Prospect theory contends that utility theory is inadequate to explain 
the evaluation of a gamble because utility theory is based on the principle 
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that a prospect is assessed as a function of the acquired prospect minus its 
cost (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) which fails to acknowledge that 
individuals will commonly evaluate the prospect and the cost individually 
which is a different decision making process. This is an important distinction 
for the purpose of the research project as it introduces the notion that an 
executive may be more prepared to accept risk when funding a fair opposed 
to acquiring a prospect at fair price. 
 Hermalin (1993) argues that manager with career concerns may opt 
for a riskier project as, it is claimed, in choosing the riskiest project around 
he minimizes the possibility of reputational risk (assuming that the market 
can view the project risk). Hermalin claims that project risk and reputational 
risk are different and need not be positively correlated. He goes further to 
suggest that the only reason to link the managers remuneration to return is to 
influence the manager to invest in the right kind of projects and claims that 
this unnecessary because managers are inherently risk averse. Rose (1973) 
claims that agents do indeed need to be motivated with payoff structures and 
that, in general, these structures are not incompatible with the expectations of 
the principal. 
 Whilst this position is at odds with the literature Hermalin returns to 
common options by identifying that when a manager has private information 
he may reveal it in such as to serve his purpose ie. To make a project appears 
less risky when seeking higher management approval, or conversely, to 
appear more risky if this suits his purpose. Hermalin identifies such 
misrepresentation as a problem of agency which cannot be managed through 
contact design on the basis that a contact cannot be insulated from the market 
and, therefore, it will always underpin the manager’s career concerns. 
 Tying back to the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Bowman 
(1980) Shapira (2002) argues that executives are more likely to take risk 
when they are unlikely to meet targets. Furthermore executives are more 
likely to take riskier action when their own position is threatened than when 
they are secure. Risk can be seen as a function of the performance gap as 
Shapira found that the greater the gap the greater the executive’s appetite for 
risk. Shapira found evidence of this position in an examination of 
government bond traders where “Their profit and loss figures have a 
profound effect on their behavior.” (Shapira 2002, p. 16). Shapira’s research 
also speaks to consequence in decision making provides examples individual 
trader’s being terminated for auctioning high risk decisions. This is an 
important consideration when viewed in the context of risk seeking behavior 
following poor performance as the only way to bridge the performance gap 
was to take the high risk option and if the consequence for failing to achieve 
target is the same, termination in this case, then there is no downside risk for 
the individual, only for the organization. 
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 Performance is a central executive risk appetite in the literature, 
however, little is said about the influence of market share in risk decisions 
which is identified by Woo (1987). The potential for a correlation between 
market share and risk taking was examined by Woo employing a path 
analysis methodology. The research could only deliver a qualified conclusion 
that reduced risk may correlate to market share. 
 Determining  the risk appetite of an organization will help in 
determining the limit to which it can accept or take a risk which eventually, 
affect the value of the firm either positively or negatively.Also, the ability of 
the firm to define its risk appetite to determine the risk management to adopt 
in reducing the attendant risks that are likely to affect the firm’s value. 
The Role and Benefits of Risk Appetite  
 The key role that risk appetite has to play here is in helping 
organization’s to make better decisions. Almost all of the decisions that an 
organization has to make involve an element of risk, meaning that when 
making the decision the organization cannot predict, with absolute certainty, 
the outcome that will arise. 
 An organization with a low appetite for risk might pass up certain 
seemingly beneficial opportunities on the grounds that the level of return 
they will actually receive is too variable. In contracts an organization with a 
higher appetite for risk might accept the very same opportunities. 
 Risk appetite has a key role to play in supporting the design of an 
organization’s strategy and the resultant achievement of its care objectives . 
COSO (2004) states: 
A key for any organization is to balance the expectations of its 
various stakeholders by allocating its limited resources in such a way that it 
is able to maximize its overall value to these various groups. This is a 
difficult task at the best of times, however it is much easier to achieve where 
the organization has a clear picture of its stakeholders’ appetite for risk. 
The role for risk appetite in this context is that, if set correctly, it can 
be used to summarize and where possible combine the risk preferences of an 
organization’s various stakeholder groups. The idea being that an 
organization should consider the views of its various stakeholders and 
thereby set its appetite for specific risks in a manner that achieve the best 
possible balance of these views. 
Pursuit of profit without a defined appetite for risk can lead to 
disaster. Many apparent risk management failures have been caused by 
pursuit of profits with the risks being poorly understood. Often management 
makes the mistake of focusing on the appetite of one group of stakeholders 
without giving sufficient weight to the appetites of others 
“Value is maximized when management sets strategy and objectives 
to strike an optimal balance between growth and return goals and related 
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risks, and efficiently and effectively deploys resources in pursuit of the 
entity’s objectives”. 
By setting boundaries for risk taking the concept of risk appetite has 
an important role to play in maintaining appropriate corporate governance. 
The idea being that by clearly expressing, setting and  
Monitoring its appetite for risk an organization can help to constrain 
board/ management decision-making by ensuring that they: 
• Do not make decisions that expose to organization to an excessive 
amount of risk by investing in risk activities or reducing expenditure 
on risk control 
• Do not make conservative decisions that expose the organization to 
too little risk and hence generating an insufficient return on its 
activities  
This role is particularly emphasized by regulators and rating 
agencies. Some stated publicly their support for it. 
“……our ERM methodology emphasizes the role that a well-defined 
risk appetite plays in risk governance. A statement of risk appetite can go a 
long way toward strategic aspects of risk taking.” (Standard and Poor’s 
2007) 
“Risk appetite defines the level and nature of risks to which the board 
considers it is acceptable to expose the firm. It therefore defines the 
boundaries of activity that the board intends for the firm. It is an essential 
component of risk frameworks.” (FSA 2006) 
 The table below summarizes the various roles and benefits that can be 
assigned to an effective risk appetite framework 
Table 1 
 
 
  Benefits 
Support strategic Setting 
 
Enhanced performance by facilitating the achievement of an 
organizations objectives (e.g. improvement profits, growth, 
cost control, etc.) 
Improvement strategic planning by highlighting which risks to 
take and which to avoid 
Achieve a balance risk profile, thereby increasing the 
organization’s capacity on take on risk where this is value 
adding (an organization that reduces its exposures to take the 
risk that are outside its appetite will free up capacity for the 
risks that it wants to take 
Support risk management Better allocation of risk management resources by targeting 
areas of over or under exposure 
Improvement  clarity regarding the benefits of risk 
management expenditure leading to better board and 
management ‘buy in ’ 
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 Foster a risk aware culture 
Set boundaries for risk 
taking 
Enhanced corporate governance leading to happier investors, 
regulators and rating agencies 
Decision makers are motivated to make better and more 
consistent decisions 
Support stakeholder value 
maximization 
Improvement management of stakeholder expectations 
Enhanced organizational performance (e.g. improved return, 
profit, growth, cost control, etc.) 
Value (e.g. share price) of the organization increases 
Corporate governance and 
transparency 
Improved information for external stakeholders 
 
Source: Adapted from AIRMIC (2009) 
 
 An effective enterprise risk appetite framework should be capable of 
providing benefits to the organization’s internal and external stakeholders, as 
summarized in the table above. 
Methods for Expressing Appetite 
 As explained above the multi-dimensional nature of risk appetite 
means that it can be expressed in a variety of different ways. Below are some 
of the more common ways in which an organization’s appetite for risk can be 
expressed. 
1.Setting a boundary on a probability and impact grid. 
 One of the most widespread approaches is to place an organization’s 
risks on a probability and impact matrix and then draw a line to demarcate 
the boundary between those risks that are deemed to be ‘acceptable’ and 
those that are not. 
One benefits of this approach is that it can be applied an organization 
and at all levels. Moreover it uses standard risk assessment terminology that 
individuals should already be familiar with, which makes it easy to 
communicate and therefore embed within an organization. However the 
problem with this approach is that it can promote a negative view of risk-
with action only taken where risk exposures exceed the agreed line. 
 2.Economic capital measures (balance sheet based expressions) 
Balance sheet based measures of risk appetite, such as economic 
capital, can be a very effective way to express an organization’s overall 
appetite for risk. This approach is especially popular with financial 
institutions where organizations set levels of ‘buffer’ capital that can be used 
to help absorb unexpected losses and or allocate their available capital to 
specific business units, activities and even risks. 
This allows an organization to express in a few ‘simple’ numbers he 
balance it wants to achieve between its ability to absorb losses by holding 
surplus capital and desire to invest this capital in order to generate a positive 
return. The idea being that an organization with a low appetite for risk will 
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wish to hold more capital, thus passing up certain positive net present value 
investments and vice-versa. 
This method of expression can also be used to modify the risk 
premium/hurdle rates that are applied to investment decisions, the higher the 
hurdle, the lower the appetite for risk. High risk premium/hurdle rates show 
that the organization in question requires a high level of return (that will be 
effectively added to its capital buffer) when taking risky investments. 
 3. Changes in credit rating 
Another popular expression of risk appetite is to changes in credit 
rating. Where, for example, an organization with an ‘AA’ rating might state 
that it does not wish to take any risks that may cause a downgrade to an ‘A’ 
rating. Intuitively such an expression of risk appetite is very simple. No 
organization that has a credit rating is likely to want to suffer a downgrade. 
Hence it reason that reference should made to this when such an organization 
is expressing its risk appetite. 
In some ways credit rating based expressions of risk appetite can 
even be taken as a rough proxy for economic capital based expressions, as 
discussed above. Both methods of expression reflect the organization’s 
preferences regarding its ‘probability of default’ (i.e. 
insolvency/bankruptcy). Where an economic capital based expression might 
not prove cost effective to produce, a credit rating based expression could be 
used instead. In such a situation, the organization is effectively outsourcing 
the calculation of its probability of default to a rating agency rather than 
relying on its own finance staff. 
However there are problems with this approach. One key issue is that 
it relies on the credit being an accurate reflection of an organization’s 
exposure to risk, an area that has received significant attention during the 
current credit crunch. Moreover, a credit rating is a very blunt instrument 
that will not be very sensitive to the individual risky decisions that an 
organization has to make. 
 4.Profit and loss 
Profit and loss based expressions risk appetite are often popular with 
shareholders and the boards of quoted companies. As with balance sheet 
approaches, profit and loss based expressions also have a beneficial role to 
play in strategy setting by helping decision makers understand the relative 
merits and hence weight the various outcomes that could be associated with 
their decisions. 
However such expressions are frequently mis-understood by 
organizations, many of whom have an unfortunate habit of using them to 
only express their exposures to down side risks. This is exemplified in 
organizations that set maximum loss figures or issue crude statements like 
‘we do not wish to report a loss in any one accounting year’. 
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The trouble with such statements is that they can promote a negative 
view of risk, leading to undue conservatism by focusing attention on the 
maximum amount of potential loss. A good example of this is within 
financial services where some organizations appear to be unwittingly 
constraining their lending activities by setting maximum loss amounts that 
effectively prevent them from engaging in potentially profitable lending, 
because by doing so they might breach these limits in either the current or 
some future downturn. 
5.Value based measure 
Value based expression of risk appetite have received much less 
attention in the practical literature than areas such as economic capital or 
profit/loss. This arguably reflects the capital/profit based preferences of 
many of the current industry leaders in risk appetite thinking, that is the large 
financial institutions). Nevertheless the lack of attention paid to value based 
expressions is rather surprising given the linkages between the concept of 
risk appetite and ERM, which has at its heart the relationship that exists 
between an organization’s risk profile and value. 
A simple way to express an organization’s appetite in terms 
(assuming of course that it is quoted) is to set limits around the volatility of 
its share price or perhaps to set a target share price. The logic being that 
where a quoted company suffers a sudden loss it may also see a decline in its 
share price. Similarly quoted companies that don’t take chances may also 
suffer a fall in their share price, if the market assumes that this will lead to 
lower profits in the long run. Hence by setting volatility limits or a target 
share price a company can direct its attention to investments, projects and 
activities that are likely to achieve these targets/limits. 
However such an approach clearly relies on there being a strong 
relationship between a company’s market value and the decisions that it 
makes regarding its risk profile. In practice share price movements are often 
influenced by a range of factors that are outside of a company’s control. 
6.Setting limits, targets or thresholds for key ‘indicators’ 
This method of expression for risk appetite is arguably the simplest 
and probably also the most widespread. Even organizations that do not 
explicitly state that do not explicitly state their appetite for risk are likely to 
have a range of indicators that set limits, targets r thresholds 
Such indicators are often demarcated into one of three categories: 
• Key risk indicators- that are indicators which help an organization 
to determine whether specific controls to a specific risk event. 
• Key control indicators- that are indicators that help an 
organization to determine whether specific controls are operating 
effectively 
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• Key performance indicators- that are indicators that an 
organization monitors to keep track of its financial performance 
or operational efficiency. 
Indicators like this can be monitored without setting limits, targets or 
thresholds. However, it is common to set targets so that management can 
monitor those indicators that most require their attention. 
7.Qualitative Statements 
Almost all of the organizations that formally express their appetite for 
risk include one or more qualitative statements. Such statements might 
include: 
• We have low appetite for risk 
• We have no appetite for fraud/financial crime risk 
• We have a zero tolerance for regulatory breaches 
• We will at all times attempt to avoid negative press coverage 
• We will not take risks that effect quality of customer service 
provided 
• We will committed to protecting the environment. 
Such statements can be very useful and they can help to fill the gaps 
of an organization’s appetite for risk by expressing certain attitudes or 
philosophies (e.g. an organization’s wish to avoid regulatory sanction and or 
reputation damage) that cannot be articulated numerically. Moreover they 
can be applied to areas of risk that are difficult to quantify effectively, such 
as reputation risks. Finally, they are often easy to understand and 
communicate across the organization and can even be integrated within an 
organization’s policies, ethical statement or statement of values. 
Risk Return and Firm Value 
 While individuals have risk preferences (and obviously act at times in 
a risk averse or loss averse way), it is difficult to see how firms could have 
risk preference in the same way that individuals do. The firm itself is merely 
a legal entity and Articles of Association cannot have risk preference. We 
cannot understand the firm as if it were an individual unless it is a one-
person business. In practice, corporate decisions are made by groups of 
people who may have little of their personal wealth at risk. Furthermore, 
firms are in business to put capital at risk in order to generate return. 
 However this does not mean that risk does not cause a firm any 
problems. The best way to think about this is to investigate the impact of risk 
on the value of the firm-this is the maximum amount of money that the firm 
could be sold for. This value should be equivalent to the present value of the 
European Scientific Journal   August 2013  edition vol.9, No.22  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
341 
firm’s future expected or average cash flows discounted at an appropriate 
discount rate r: 
                                 Value=µv=∑ Ent=0  (cash flow t) / (1+r)t 
 Where E denotes “expected value.” (For a quoted company, this 
value should also be equal to the number of shares multiplied by the share 
price, although fluctuation in share prices makes this imprecise relationship). 
 There is a distinction between a firm’s profit (gross of tax) and cash 
flows so that cash flow may be non-linear function λ of gross profits (t), that 
is 
                                   Value=   µv=∑ Ent=0  (λ(t))/ (1+r)t  
 It follows therefore that risk will be a problem if it reduces firm value 
µv and that this can happen in three broad ways: 
1. If risk increases the discount rate r. for quoted companies, the 
discount rate only reflects that risk that the shareholders cannot 
themselves remove by holding a diversified share portfolio (the so-
called systematic risk). The tragedy is that firms find it very difficult 
to influence their systematic risk. 
2. If risk reduces profits ( t) whatever the shape of the cash flow 
functions. This may happen if the firm has to pay a risk premium to 
stakeholders who dislike risk, and/or if risk reduces profits because 
information is asymmetric (reading to so-called agency costs). 
3. If the function λ (t) is concave, so that risk reduces E (λ (t)). not a 
fixed value is not a fixed value but can itself fluctuate because not all 
risk can be removed by risk management. 
 One way of understanding this risk is to cash flow  λ(t) can have a 
variety of possible values in each year t depending on the outcome (of 
course, these are not known in advance). This means that value itself is risky, 
and we can denote risk by the term σv we may get a risk possibility frontier 
which we expect to be upward sloping and concave (so that reductions are 
only achieved by sacrificing increasing larger amounts of value). This 
frontier denotes the smaller level of risk σv associated with each µv. the 
smallest risk is that obtained after all cash flow increasing risk management 
activities have been exhausted (so that further attempts to reduce the left of 
the line is technically possible. 
Developing Risk Appetite 
 We have identified the characteristics of an effective risk appetite 
statement and noted how those characteristics are useful in managing risk. 
We have also examined he relationship between risk appetite and risk 
management. Now we will discuss how an organization can bring out the 
many “implicit feelings” that management and the board may have about 
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that they believe is the organization’s risk appetite and how discussion of 
those feelings leads to development of risk appetite. 
 Developing risk appetite is not an end in itself and should not require 
an inordinate amount of time. Remember the purposes of risk appetite are 
• To provide effective communication throughout the organization in 
order to drive the implementation of enterprise risk management; 
• To change discussions about risk so that they involve questioning of 
whether risks are properly identified and managed within the risk 
appetite; and 
• To provide a basis for further discussion of risk appetite as strategies 
and objectives change. 
 Also, keep in mind that any expression of risk appetite must be 
preceded by a discussion of strategies and objectives. The risk appetite must 
be linked to those objectives. 
 Management often use one of three approaches to discuss and 
develop their risk appetite: 
 Facilitated discussions 
 Discussions related to objectives and strategies, or 
 Development of performance models. 
Conclusion 
 An organization must consider its risk appetite at the same time 
decides which goals or operational tactics to pursue. To determine risk 
appetite, management, with board review and concurrence, should take three 
steps: 
1. Develop risk appetite 
2. Communicate risk appetite 
3. Monitor and update risk appetite 
 These three steps are discussed briefly below, and in detail in the 
body of this paper. 
 Develop Risk Appetite 
 Developing risk appetite does not mean the organization shuns risk as 
part of its strategic initiatives. Quite the opposite. Just as organizations set 
different objectives, they will develop different risk appetites. There is no 
standard or universal risk appetite statement that applies to all organizations, 
nor is there a “right” risk appetite. Rather, management must make choices 
in setting risk appetite, understanding the trade-offs involved in having 
higher or lower risk appetites. 
 Communicate Risk Appetite 
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 Several common approaches are used to communicate risk appetite. 
The first is to create an overall risk appetite statement that is broad enough 
yet descriptive enough for organizational units to manage their risks 
consistently within it. The second is to communicate risk appetite for each 
major class of organizational objectives. The third is to communicate risk 
appetite for different categories of risk. 
 Monitor and Update Risk Appetite 
 Once risk appetite is communicated, management, needs to revisit 
and reinforce it. Risk appetite cannot be set once and then left alone. Rather, 
it should be reviewed in relation to how the organization operates, especially 
if the entity’s business model changes. Management should monitor 
activities for consistency with risk appetite through a combination of 
ongoing monitoring and separate evaluations. Internal auditing can support 
management in this monitoring. In addition, organizations, when monitoring 
risk appetite, should focus on creating a culture that is risk-aware and that 
has organizational goals consistent with the boards. 
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